Policy briefs

By David Marples, September 11, 2007

The issue of building a domestic nuclear power station in Belarus has cropped up several times of late, but there is no definitive program in place. A year ago, the issue appeared to be resolved, with a proposed location in Mahileu region and a timetable for bringing the first reactor on line (Belgazeta, September 12, 2006). Recent statements by leading figures in the Belarusian government, however, indicate that the question has not been thought through properly and may constitute simply a reassuring message to the public in light of the continuing problems of reliance on supplies of Russian oil and gas.

The Belarusian media has reported in the past that following exploration of possible sites for a nuclear plant in the mid-1990s that a VVER (water-pressurized reactor) station would be completed by 2013-2015 and would reach a maximum capacity of 2,000 megawatts (i.e. two 1,000-megawatt reactors). One of the chief advocates has been Mikhail Myasnikovich, a close associate of President Alexander Lukashenka, and the chairman of the Belarusian Academy of Sciences (EDM, December 6, 2006). Despite the current ban on building reactors, which expires in 2008, as well as the continuing medical problems and contaminated land that resulted from the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, the Belarusian government declared that construction would begin in 2010.

By Yaraslau Kryvoi

This Article analyzes the role of legal, political and economic factors in determining the effectiveness of trade sanctions imposed in response to violation of labor standards. It begins by addressing the theoretical aspects of the linkage between trade and labor and then turns to the practical aspects by examining the application of the recently revised European Union's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).

The Article suggests that the reasons why countries fail to respect core labor standards are of critical importance in determining the potential effectiveness of sanctions. If the reason is principally economic the mere threat of sanctions may be enough to motivate a country to modify its policies to prevent economic damages resulting from sanctions. Sanctions are less effective in changing the conduct of countries which violate core labor standards primarily due to political reasons.

The European Union's decisions to terminate trade preferences for labor rights violations for Myanmar in 1997 and Belarus in 2006 did not have any significant impact on these countries and are unlikely to achieve their desired objectives in the future for two main reasons. First, the main motivation for these countries' violations is political and the cost of the undemocratic regimes' compliance with international obligations is greater than the cost of non-compliance. Second, both countries have powerful 'sponsors', which undermine the economic impact of the European Union's sanctions. Despite the limited effectiveness against the target countries, the withdrawal of trade preferences may have other important effects, such as deterring other potential violators, demonstrating the European Union's commitment to promote core labor standards and strengthening the link between trade and fair labor practices.

Public Information Notices (PINs) form part of the IMF's efforts to promote transparency of the IMF's views and analysis of economic developments and policies. With the consent of the country (or countries) concerned, PINs are issued after Executive Board discussions of Article IV consultations with member countries, of its surveillance of developments at the regional level, of post-program monitoring, and of ex post assessments of member countries with longer-term program engagements. PINs are also issued after Executive Board discussions of general policy matters, unless otherwise decided by the Executive Board in a particular case.

On August 24, 2007, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation with the Republic of Belarus.¹

• Why, despite the relatively small volume of estimated losses, the Belarusian authorities had been trying to avoid the suspension of Belarus from the EU's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)?

• Does the end of the ‘GSP saga’ imply the end to the ‘strategy of dialogue’ towards Belarus as suggested by some of the EU representatives? Has the EU overestimated its capabilities to influence the situation in Belarus by using the GSP as a policy tool?

• How can the new EU strategy towards Belarus look like after June 21, 2007? What are the tools the EU might consider to influence the situation in Belarus after the GSP’s potential is apparently exhausted?

• What is the role of the Belarusian civil society in helping the EU to devise such policy tools towards Belarus?

Participants of the Expert Panel:
Olga Stuzhinskaya, director of the Brussels-based Office for a Democratic Belarus;

Viachaslau Pazniak, professor, European Humanities University, head of the Wider Europe internet portal;

Alaksandr Lahviniec, professor, European Humanities University (Vilnius, Lithuania) assistant to the leader of the movement “For Freedom!” Alaksandr Milinkevich;

On May 5-15, 2007 independent sociologists conducted a public opinion poll covering the most topical aspects of life in Belarus (those face-to-face interviewed are 1530 persons aged 18 and over, margin of error doesn't exceed 0.03). Below you may find commentaries to the most important findings of these sociological procedure.

Full text of the material can be found under the following link: http://www.iiseps.org/e5-07.html